In response to my recent article in
The Hindu, “
The real questions from Kudankulam”
(edit page, September 14, 2012), supporting nuclear power and arguing
for an independent regulatory authority, I received much feedback,
largely positive, some critical; some of which deserves a response. Many
of these points have been made by others, repeatedly, but some are new
to me.
1) Independent oversight: Two credible people said that I was too
critical of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and particularly the
current regulatory authority, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB),
which they said has been doing its job “without fear or favour.” This
may be true (indeed, India’s nuclear safety record is outstanding) but,
if the Kudankulam mess teaches us anything, it is that perceptions
matter as much as reality. A truly independent AERB successor, the
proposed Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA), with transparency,
significant powers and, ideally, international representation, would
also serve the cause of safety in future. That the AERB has acted fairly
and independently so far does not guarantee that it will always do so.
Another point is that the NSRA cannot draw on independent nuclear
expertise in India because none exists outside the DAE (one reason for
international representation). We should encourage investments by the
private sector, subject to NSRA oversight, and encourage leading non-DAE
institutions, such as the Indian Institutes of Technology, to develop
programmes in nuclear engineering. Meanwhile, the NSRA will require
civil engineers, seismologists, radiation safety specialists, and other
experts besides nuclear scientists, who exist independently of the DAE.
2) Risks and reality: The probability of a nuclear catastrophe
may be very low but is not zero. How can we expose people to such a
risk? Indeed, statements from the DAE like “Kudankulam is 100% safe” are
not credible and a proper risk assessment is required. But, based on
experience, the risk of a catastrophic accident at a nuclear plant seems
minuscule compared to a similar risk at unscrutinised chemical
factories everywhere: despite Bhopal, which is yet to be cleaned up
adequately, there is no demand for bans on such factories. Most nuclear
accidents have had few or no fatalities and no leak of radiation. In the
past 25 years (since Chernobyl), only Fukushima has resulted in
significant radiation exposure to the public. Few industries can claim a
better record of safety.
As for nuclear liability: all of us deserve answers on this. It is not
consistent to assert safety while denying liability, as the government
apparently seeks to do.
What of military or terrorist attacks? Israel attacked an Iraqi plant in
1981 and a putative Syrian plant in 2007, but neither plant was loaded
with fuel. An attack on Iran could have graver results. To cause a
meltdown, such an attack would have to destroy the cooling system but
keep the nuclear fuel confined. This looks unlikely, but I’m not a
nuclear scientist and the question should be addressed by the DAE.
Terrorist threats on the ground look still less likely to succeed. As
for a 9/11 type attack: according to the U.S. Council on Foreign
Relations website, “no one knows” what would happen if a commercial
airliner crashed into one of the older U.S. plants, though many of them
are built to withstand impacts from light planes. However, experts rule
out a nuclear explosion. A conventional explosion can still spread
radiation, but not on the scale of Chernobyl. These are points that, I
believe, the DAE should address.
3) Emergency preparedness and liability: In the event of a
disaster at Kudankulam, it is impossible to evacuate such an area
rapidly, and medical facilities are inadequate. But this is not unique
to nuclear power. Cyclones, floods, industrial accidents all occur
regularly and we have not learned our lessons. The DAE should take the
lead in ensuring disaster preparedness near its installations, but
cannot be blamed for our country’s larger failures.
